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BEWARE THE FRIENDS YOU KEEP AND 
THE PLACES YOU SLEEP: THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT’S LIMITED PROTECTION 
OVER VISITORS AND THEIR BELONGINGS 
ALYSHA C. PRESTON† 
INTRODUCTION 
The Arizona state police obtained a warrant to search a 
Kingman residence for drugs and drug paraphernalia.1  Upon 
entering the home, the police found Alicia Gilstrap taking a 
shower; Gilstrap was not named in the warrant.2  After escorting 
her to another room, one of the officers found and moved her 
purse from the bathroom and placed it in an adjoining bedroom.3  
While searching that bedroom, another officer searched the 
purse, finding Gilstrap’s driver’s license, small bags of 
marijuana, methamphetamine residue, packages of red and blue 
baggies, and a scale.4  Subsequently, Gilstrap was arrested.5  
Having not being named in the search warrant, could Gilstrap 
claim that the police violated her Fourth Amendment right 
against unreasonable searches and seizures? 
The Fourth Amendment does not deny a visitor the ability to 
bring a Fourth Amendment claim.6  However, determining what 
protection the Fourth Amendment affords is not exactly clear.  
By its text, the Fourth Amendment requires that searches and 
seizures are reasonable and that warrants are both particular 
† J.D., 2016, St. John’s University School of Law. 
1 State v. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d 43, 44 (Ariz. 2014). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Id. There is no indication that either officer knew that the purse belonged to 
Gilstrap. See id. 
5 Id. 
6 See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 265–67, 272–73 (1960) (finding that 
a visitor has standing to bring a Fourth Amendment claim), overruled by United 
States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). 
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and based on probable cause.7  The term “reasonable” has been 
interpreted as protecting one’s “reasonable expectation of 
privacy,”8 but the United States Supreme Court has failed to 
provide a consistent explanation for defining what circumstances 
are deemed reasonable.9  Nonetheless, it is a well-established 
principle that one does hold a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in their the home.10 
The right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
in the home is considered “the core of the Fourth Amendment.”11  
Not only is the home expressly mentioned in the text of the 
Fourth Amendment,12 but the home has also been regarded as 
“the most essential bastion of privacy recognized by the law,”13 
and a place where an individual expects the most privacy.14 
Whether a visitor holds a similar reasonable expectation is 
less transparent.  This is mostly because determining what is 
reasonable “is the central mystery of Fourth Amendment law.”15  
First introduced in Katz v. United States,16 the reasonable 
expectation of privacy doctrine has been seen as a two-fold 
requirement: “first that a person have exhibited an actual 
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the 
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’ ”17  Defining the latter has become the primary 
7 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 (1980). 
8 See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. 
REV. 503, 504 (2007); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring). 
9 Kerr, supra note 8, at 503. 
10 See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 612 (1999); see also Stephanie M. Stern, 
The Inviolate Home: Housing Exceptionalism in the Fourth Amendment, 95 CORNELL 
L. REV. 905, 905 (2010) (“The ideal of the inviolate home dominates the Fourth 
Amendment. The case law accords stricter protection to residential search and 
seizure than to many other privacy incursions.”). 
11 See Layne, 526 U.S. at 612. 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in 
their . . . houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated . . . .”). 
13 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 106 (1998) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
14 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.3, at 725 (5th ed. 2012). 
15 Kerr, supra note 8, at 504. 
16 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
17 Id. at 361. The Supreme Court later replaced the subjective prong, and added 
that “concepts of real or personal property law” are relevant. See Rakas v. Illinois, 
439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978). In other cases, however, the Court has rejected this 
notion. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 504. 
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cause of inconsistent rulings and has left most confused about 
how it applies.18  For one, who is “society” and second, how do we 
know what it thinks?  The Supreme Court’s answer to these 
questions has led the Court through “a series of inconsistent and 
bizarre results.”19 
In an effort to apply Katz and determine what protection the 
Fourth Amendment affords a visitor’s belongings, state and 
federal courts have applied one of three tests.20  The first test is 
known as the possession test and assesses whether the visitor 
possessed the item at the time the search warrant was 
executed.21  In comparison, the second test, known as the 
relationship test, looks at the connection between the visitor and 
the premises.22  The third and final test takes a different 
approach.  Known as the actual-notice test, it focuses on whether 
the officers were given notice about the item’s ownership before it 
was searched.23  Recently, in State v. Gilstrap,24 the Arizona 
Supreme Court joined several other courts in adopting the 
possession test, classifying it as the most efficient.25  When 
applying it, the court found that although Gilstrap held a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the Kingman residence, that 
expectation did not reasonably extend to her purse, which was 
not in her actual possession.26 
 
18 Kerr, supra note 8, at 504–05. See generally Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. 
Schumacher, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Autonomy in Fourth 
Amendment Cases: An Empirical Look at “Understandings Recognized and 
Permitted by Society”, 42 DUKE L.J. 727 (1993) (finding through an empirical study 
that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of what society finds reasonable does not 
reflect societal understanding). 
19 See Kerr, supra note 8, at 505. Some argue that the Supreme Court’s 
decisions do not reflect society’s understanding. See Slobogin & Schumacher, supra 
note 18, at 733–34, 737–42 (finding through an empirical study that the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of what society finds reasonable does not reflect societal 
understanding). 
20 See, e.g., United States v. Teller, 397 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1968) (applying the 
possession test); United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1973) (applying the 
relationship test); State v. Nabarro, 525 P.2d 573 (Haw. 1974) (applying the actual-
notice test). 
21 See State v. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d 43, 44–45 (Ariz. 2014). 
22 Id. at 45. 
23 Id. 
24 332 P.3d 43 (Ariz. 2014). 
25 See id. at 46–47. 
26 Id. 
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The existence of these three tests adds to the confusion of 
interpreting the Fourth Amendment and ultimately fails to 
provide guidance for officers conducting searches, since 
“[s]earches often occur [under] harried, dangerous 
circumstances.”27  It is therefore imperative that the Supreme 
Court provides a guideline that officers can readily turn to when 
conducting these searches.  A uniform test would not only make 
it easier for officers to determine when an item belonging to a 
visitor may be searched,28 but would also lead to court efficiency 
and uniformity in rulings.29 
Thus, this Note concludes that the Arizona Supreme Court 
correctly applied the possession test and strongly urges the 
Supreme Court to address the issue and follow in Arizona’s 
footsteps.  The possession test not only provides the best 
guidance for both officers and courts, but also provides the most 
precision and clarity.  More importantly, this approach aligns 
with current Supreme Court case law and conforms to 
established Fourth Amendment principles.  Holding otherwise 
would gravely undermine policy, disregard current precedents, 
and undervalue the sole purpose for the Fourth Amendment’s 
existence: to protect one’s reasonable expectation of privacy.  Part 
I examines the scope of the Fourth Amendment, its reasonable 
expectation of privacy standard, and its application to visitors.  
Part II provides an overview of the three tests.  Part III 
concludes by illuminating the precision and accuracy of the 
possession test, its conformity to current Fourth Amendment 
principles, its potential to guide officers during execution, and its 
ability to lead to uniformed rulings. 
I. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution guarantees 
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”30  As it was ultimately adopted, the Fourth 
27 Id. at 46. See infra note 174. 
28 See infra notes 151–55 and accompanying text. 
29 See discussion infra Part III.D. 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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Amendment has been interpreted as containing two separate 
clauses, “the first protecting the basic right to be free from 
unreasonable searches and seizures and the second requiring 
that warrants be particular and supported by probable cause.”31 
The Fourth Amendment is a constitutional right that 
protects all.  To be free from unreasonable searches and seizures 
is a freedom that “extends to the innocent and guilty alike.”32  
This right “marks the right of privacy as one of the unique values 
of our civilization.”33  The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to 
protect one’s privacy in that “the hands of the police” shall not 
touch another person’s property, “unless they have a search 
warrant issued by a magistrate on probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation.”34  Thus, violations of this right trigger the 
exclusionary rule, which allows for the suppression of any 
evidence secured as a result.35 
The reasonableness and warrant requirements are driving 
forces behind Fourth Amendment protection.36  The United 
States Supreme Court has stated that “[a] search without a 
warrant demands exceptional circumstances” and “there must be 
compelling reasons to justify the absence of a search warrant.”37  
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to ensure that any 
invasion of privacy by the government is “reasonable.”38   
 
31 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584 (1980). 
32 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Fourth Amendment, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment (last visited Mar. 29, 2016). See 
also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to state 
courts and local actors); McDonald, 335 U.S. at 453 (“[T]he law provides as a 
sanction against the flouting of this constitutional safeguard the suppression of 
evidence secured as a result . . . when it is tendered in a federal court.”). 
36 See ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS 16 (2003) (“The 
history of the Fourth Amendment in contemporary times has focused mainly on the 
meaning of the reasonableness clause and the importance of a warrant.”). Although 
it is debatable as to whether the framers of the Constitution intended for the 
requirement of a search warrant, the Supreme Court has consistently articulated its 
preference for warrants. See id. at 11–13. 
37 McDonald, 335 U.S. at 454. 
38 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (“[T]he ultimate 
touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’ ” (quoting Brigham City v. 
Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006))). 
FINAL_PRESTON 8/25/2016  12:06 PM 
212 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:207   
Generally, the issuance of a valid judicial warrant39 meets the 
reasonableness requirement, since a judicial warrant ensures 
that all “inferences to support a search are ‘drawn by a neutral 
and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime.’ ”40 
As time progressed, however, the warrant requirement 
became much easier to circumvent.  Although presumed 
unreasonable,41 a warrantless search is not always deemed to be 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  Instead, the requirement 
of a warrant is premised on Katz’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy doctrine; any circumstance which results in a reduced 
reasonable expectation is no longer a search, and the need for a 
warrant is no longer necessary.42  Unfortunately, defining what 
constitutes a reasonable expectation has been far from easy.43 
39 In order for a search warrant to be valid it must (1) be based on probable 
cause, (2) be supported by Oath or affirmation (magistrate requirement), and 
(3) “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.” See id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(a) 
(stating what a warrant must say in order to be valid). The particularity 
requirement is important, since “[t]he uniformly applied rule is that a search 
conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the particularity 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.” Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 n.5 (1984); see also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557–
58 (2004) (finding that a search warrant for defendant’s ranch that failed to describe 
the persons or things to be seized was invalid on its face). 
40 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 
(1948)). 
41 Fourth Amendment, supra note 35. 
42 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90–91 (1998) (finding that a person in a 
commercial residence holds a reduced expectation of privacy, and although there 
was no warrant, found that no search occurred in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment). The Supreme Court has defined exceptional, “well-delineated” 
circumstances in which a search warrant is not required. Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967). There are five well-known exceptions. First, if a person legally 
authorized to do so gives consent, the police do not need a warrant. See WILLIAM W. 
GREENHALGH, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 20 (3d ed. 2010). Second, 
under the plain view doctrine, if an officer observes a person in the act of committing 
an offense or any probable evidence in a constitutionally protected area, a warrant is 
not required. See id. at 19–20. Third, when persons are lawfully arrested, the police 
can search the place where the arrest is made without a warrant; this is known as a 
search incident to arrest. See id. at 16–17. Fourth, known as the Terry exception, if 
the police can articulate a reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot or that a person 
holds weapons, the officer may conduct a stop and frisk of the person. See id. at 18–
19. Fifth, if the police feel that the time it would take to obtain a search warrant 
would either risk public safety, or result in the loss of evidence, the police may 
perform a search without a warrant; this is known as exigent circumstances or the 
“ ‘hot pursuit’ exception.” See id. at 18. These exceptions were originally based on 
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B. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Doctrine and Its 
Application to Visitors 
Since its appearance in Katz, the reasonable expectation of 
privacy doctrine has been considered “remarkably opaque” and 
“the central mystery” of the Fourth Amendment.44  In Katz, FBI 
agents attached an electronic listening and recording device to 
the outside of a public telephone booth, where the defendant was 
placing a call.45  At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the 
recordings, which held sufficient evidence to convict him of 
violating a federal statute.46  The Supreme Court held that the 
government’s activities of electronically listening to and 
recording the defendant’s words “violated the privacy upon which 
he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth.”47  The 
Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment “protects people, 
not places,” and its protection of people depends on one’s 
reasonable expectation of privacy.48  The reasonable expectation 
of privacy doctrine was discussed further in Justice Harlan’s 
concurrence.49  In his attempt to define the doctrine, Justice 
Harlan created a two-fold requirement: “first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to 
recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ”50 
Through its subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has 
created a sliding scale for determining whether a visitor holds a 
reasonable expectation of privacy under Katz.  The issue was first 
addressed in Jones v. United States,51 which held that any person 
“legitimately on the premises” may bring a Fourth Amendment 
claim.52  However, in Rakas v. Illinois,53 the Court vigorously 
practicality concerns, but more recent exceptions are justified by a finding of a 
limited expectation of privacy. See BLOOM, supra note 36, at 101. See GREENHALGH, 
supra, at 16–22, for a list of all the recognized exceptions. 
43 See generally Kerr, supra note 8 (discussing the central issues behind the 
reasonable expectation standard). 
44 Id. at 504–05. 
45 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 353. 
48 See id. at 351–52. 
49 See id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
50 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
51 362 U.S. 257 (1960), overruled by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 
(1980). 
52 Id. at 267. 
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rejected the “legitimately on the premises” standard, finding it 
too broad.54  This standard was ultimately rejected by the Court 
in United States v. Salvucci.55 
The Supreme Court revisited the issue in Minnesota v. 
Olson.56  In Olson, the police obtained a pickup order for the 
defendant, who was suspected of being a getaway driver for a 
robbery.57  Upon finding the defendant’s location, the police, 
without a warrant, entered a duplex where the defendant was an 
overnight guest.58  Applying Katz, the Olson Court assessed 
whether an overnight guest held an expectation of privacy that 
society recognizes as reasonable:59 
To hold that an overnight guest has a [reasonable] expectation 
of privacy in his host’s home merely recognizes the everyday 
expectations of privacy that we all share. . . . From the 
overnight guest’s perspective, he seeks shelter in another’s 
home precisely because it provides him with privacy, a place 
where he and his possessions will not be disturbed by anyone 
but his host and those his host allows inside. . . . The 
houseguest is there with the permission of his host, who is 
willing to share his house and his privacy with his guest.  It is 
unlikely that the guest will be confined to a restricted area of 
the house; and when the host is away or asleep, the guest will 
have a measure of control over the premises.60 
Ultimately, the Court held that the defendant had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the duplex, therefore making the search 
unreasonable.61 
The Supreme Court narrowed its Olson holding in 
Minnesota v. Carter.62  There, the defendant was arrested after 
the police observed him inside an apartment, bagging cocaine 
with the apartment lessee.63  The Court found that the 
defendant, who was not an overnight guest and who used the 
home as a place to conduct business, did not hold the same 
53 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
54 Id. at 141–42. 
55 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980). 
56 495 U.S. 91 (1990). 
57 Id. at 93–94. 
58 Id. 
59 See id. at 97–100. 
60 Id. at 98–99. 
61 See id. at 96–98. 
62 525 U.S. 83 (1998). 
63 Id. at 85. 
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reasonable expectation of privacy as the defendant in Olson.64  
The Court stated, “An expectation of privacy in commercial 
premises . . . is different from, and indeed less than, a similar 
expectation in an individual’s home.”65  Accordingly, it held that 
since the defendant was “essentially present for a business 
transaction and [was] only in the home [for] a matter of hours,” 
he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.66 
These cases analyzing a visitor’s reasonable expectation have 
left a vague and unhelpful sliding scale.  On one end, “the 
overnight guest . . . typif[ies] those who may claim [Fourth 
Amendment] protection.67  On the other end, “one merely 
‘legitimately on the premises’ . . . typif[ies] those who may not.”68  
In the middle, no protection is granted to a guest in a home that 
is actually conducted as a place of business.69  But what these 
cases fail to address are situations where the visitor is not an 
overnight guest, and where the house is an actual dwelling and 
not a place of business.  For example, how would the Court 
address a case like United States v. Johnson,70 where the 
defendant, a visitor in a friend’s home being lawfully searched, 
was arrested after police found narcotics in her purse;71 or a case 
like State v. Reid,72 where the defendant, also a visitor in an 
apartment being lawfully searched, was arrested after the police 
found cocaine in her jacket?73  
The problem is that cases like Johnson, Reid, and similarly, 
Gilstrap, are distinguishable from current Supreme Court 
precedents Jones, Olson, and Carter.  In the latter cases, the 
police entered the home without a warrant, while in the former 
cases, the officers were armed with valid warrants to search the 
premises.  The relevance of Jones, Olson, and Carter is the 
Supreme Court’s recognition of a visitor’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy in another’s home.  Yet, for cases like Johnson, Reid, 
and Gilstrap, where the visitor is not named in a valid warrant, 
64 Id. at 90. 
65 Id. at 90 (quoting New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 700 (1987)). 
66 Id. at 90–91. 
67 Id. at 91. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 475 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
71 Id. at 978. 
72 77 P.3d 1134 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). 
73 Id. at 1135. 
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the issue turns on whether a visitor’s belongings are included in 
their expectation of privacy.74  To answer this question, federal 
and state courts have each applied one of three tests while 
simultaneously creating more confusion to already complex 
Fourth Amendment principles. 
II. DO VISITORS HOLD A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY 
IN THEIR BELONGINGS?: THE THREE TESTS CURRENTLY APPLIED 
A. The Possession Test 
The first test is known as the possession test.  Under this 
test, “officers may search personal items, such as purses or 
clothing, that are not in their owners’ possession” during the 
execution of a premises warrant.75  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Teller76 was 
the first to apply this test.77  The test stands for the proposition 
that “the search of a personal item like a purse is not regarded as 
a search of the person when the item is not in the person’s 
possession.”78  In Teller, police officers, while executing a search 
74 The Supreme Court in Rawlings v. Kentucky hinted that a person’s 
reasonable expectation may extend to their belongings. 448 U.S. 98 (1980). In 
Rawlings, the police entered a house armed with an arrest warrant. Id. at 100. The 
person named within the warrant was not present, but four other occupants, 
including Vanessa Cox and the defendant, were present. Id. After smelling 
marijuana smoke and seeing marijuana seeds, the officers proceeded to obtain a 
search warrant for the premises. Id. While conducting the search, the officers asked 
Cox to empty her purse and the defendant claimed ownership of the drugs that were 
concealed within. Id. at 101. Subsequently, the defendant was convicted of 
possession of controlled substances. Id. at 101–02. The Rawlings Court found that 
the defendant did not possess a reasonable expectation of privacy to the purse 
because he generally had no relationship to it. Id. at 103. The Court’s analysis leaves 
a compelling inference that if Cox, the owner of the purse, challenged the search, she 
would hold the reasonable expectation of privacy that the defendant lacked. See id. 
at 104–05. But even if that is true, meaning that the facts are such that Cox 
challenged the search of her purse, it does not automatically mean that her 
expectation of privacy would overcome the government’s interest making the search 
unlawful. See discussion infra Part III.A. 
75 State v. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d 43, 44–45 (Ariz. 2014). 
76 397 F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1968). 
77 Gilstrap, 332 P.3d at 44–45. 
78 Id. at 45; see also Teller, 397 F.2d at 497–98. A search is considered to be “ ‘of 
a person’ if it involves an exploration into an individual’s clothing, including a 
further search within small containers, such as wallets, cigarette boxes and the like, 
which are found in or about such clothing.” 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.5, at 283 (5th ed. 2012); see 
FINAL_PRESTON 8/25/2016  12:06 PM 
2016] THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S LIMITED PROTECTION 217 
warrant, searched the defendant’s purse that was left in another 
room.79  The court held that under these circumstances, to 
conclude that the purse was an extension of the defendant would 
be contrary to the fact that she placed it in another room and left 
it there.80 
The D.C. Circuit, as well as several state courts, has also 
adopted the possession test.81  However, many jurisdictions have 
rejected this test, finding it too broad.  Others have rejected the 
test based on the likelihood that it could prevent the 
government’s interest in successfully executing a search 
warrant.82  Accordingly, most courts have rejected the possession 
test, finding the relationship test more efficient and reasonable. 
B. The Relationship Test 
Under the relationship test, a court will examine the 
relationship between the person and the place.83  For example, in 
United States v. Micheli,84 the First Circuit applied the 
relationship test to determine whether an officer’s search of a 
briefcase was unreasonable.85  There, officers had a warrant to 
search the defendant’s office.86  However, the warrant was based 
on probable cause that the defendant’s brother, a co-owner of the 
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 7, 16–19 (1968) (finding that the search of the 
defendant’s outer clothing constituted a search of his persons). 
79 Teller, 397 F.2d at 496. 
80 Id. at 497; see infra Part III.B. 
81 E.g., United States v. Branch, 545 F.2d 177, 182 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (finding a 
search of a shoulder-bag worn by the defendant an improper search); United States 
v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that the search of a purse 
that was separate from the owner was not improper); State v. Reid, 77 P.3d 1134, 
1143 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (finding that the search of the defendant’s jacket that was 
near him but not on him was proper); Commonwealth v. Reese, 549 A.2d 909, 911 
(Pa. 1988) (“Clearly, the police are not prohibited from searching a visitor's personal 
property (not on the person) located on premises in which a search warrant is being 
executed when that property is part of the general content of the premises and is a 
plausible repository for the object of the search.”); State v. Jackson, 873 P.2d 1166, 
1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (finding that the search of a purse that was not in the 
possession of an owner was proper). 
82 E.g., United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 445 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding the 
possession rule would insulate incriminating evidence from lawful searches by 
allowing people to put it in one's purse or pockets). 
83 See Gilstrap, 332 P.3d at 45. 
84 487 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1973). 
85 See id. at 430. 
86 Id. 
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office, was engaged in illegal activity.87  While searching the 
premises, one of the officers searched what he knew to be the 
defendant’s briefcase and found counterfeit five dollar Federal 
Reserve Notes.88 
After analyzing the possession test and the Teller opinion, 
the Micheli court found the relationship test to be more 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment.89  The court held that 
whether a search violates a visitor’s Fourth Amendment right is 
determined by “reference to the reasonable expectations of 
privacy [that] visitors bring to premises.”90  To the court, the best 
way to determine a visitor’s expectation of privacy would be by 
examining the defendant’s relationship to the place.91  
Ultimately, if the person has a special relationship, meaning that 
he could have reasonably expected that some of his belongings 
would be there, a search of those belongings is not outside of the 
scope of the warrant.92  Accordingly, the court held that the 
defendant had “a special relation to the place,” since the 
defendant was a co-owner and conducted business through that 
office.93  The defendant “was not in the position of a mere visitor 
or passerby who suddenly found his belongings vulnerable to a 
search of the premises.”94 
Other courts, such as the Ninth, Fifth, and Eleventh 
Circuits, have also adopted the relationship test.95  The Eleventh 
Circuit specifically concluded that the relationship test has a 
better outcome then the possession test because under the 
relationship test, “[although] the [homeowner] of a building being 
87 See id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 431–32. 
90 Id. at 432. 
91 Id. at 431–32. 
92 Id. at 432. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 See United States v. Young, 909 F.2d 442, 444–45 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]n 
determining whether a search of personal effects violates the scope of a ‘premises’ 
warrant, one must consider the relationship between the object, the person and the 
place being searched.”); United States v. McLaughlin, 851 F.2d 283, 286–87 (9th Cir. 
1988) (finding that the police were allowed to search the briefcase of a co-owner of a 
business because of his sufficient relationship to the premises); United States v. 
Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 545 (5th Cir. 1987) (finding that the relationship between the 
defendant and the premises draws the conclusion that “[he] was not a ‘mere visitor’ 
or ‘passerby’ and thus, the agents could reasonably believe his flight bag contained 
evidence of credit card fraud”). 
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searched would lose a privacy interest in his belongings located 
there . . . a transient visitor would retain his expectation of 
privacy, whether or not his belongings are being held by him or 
have been temporarily put down.”96  Furthermore, the Eleventh 
Circuit feared that the possession rule “would facilitate the 
insulation of incriminating evidence from lawful searches 
through the simple act of stuffing it in one’s purse or pockets.”97 
In short, federal courts differ as to whether the relationship 
or the possession test should prevail.  In contrast, the actual-
notice test seems less significant, since no circuit court has yet to 
entertain it and few state courts have adopted it.  Still, it is 
important to note its approach. 
C. The Actual-Notice Test 
The actual-notice test is interpreted as an extension of the 
relationship test.98  Under the actual-notice test, the focus is on 
the notice given to the police regarding the ownership of the item 
before it is searched.99  In other words, “[t]his test allows police to 
search an item . . . unless they are put on notice that the item 
belongs to a non-resident.”100  Some state courts have found this 
test to be the most appealing.101 
An example of its application can be found in Waters v. 
State.102  There, state and federal officers were granted a warrant 
to search an apartment for evidence of drug trafficking.103  Once 
officers gained entry into the apartment, they found several 
occupants, including the defendant.104  While searching the living 
room, an officer found a coin purse where the defendant 
previously sat and, after searching it, found several tinfoil slips 
96 Young, 909 F.2d at 445. 
97 Id. 
98 State v. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d 43, 45 (Ariz. 2014). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 See, e.g., People v. McCabe, 192 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) 
(finding the search of a purse was proper because police had no notice that the purse 
belonged to a nonresident); State v. Lambert, 710 P.2d 693, 697–98 (Kan. 1985) 
(finding the search of a purse was improper because officers had no reason to believe 
that the purse belonged to the person named in the warrant); State v. Thomas, 818 
S.W.2d 350, 360 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991) (finding search improper because officers 
“knew or should have known” that the purse belonged to a nonresident). 
102 924 P.2d 437 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996). 
103 Id. at 438. 
104 Id. 
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commonly used to package crack cocaine.105  Ultimately, the 
Waters court found that “officers executing a warrant have no 
duty to inquire into ownership.”106  The court further held that 
police are entitled to assume that all objects found in a premises 
are lawfully subject to a search under a warrant and are part of 
those premises, barring “notice of some sort of ownership of a 
belonging.”107 
Unfortunately, the courts’ reasoning for applying either the 
relationship or the actual-notice test is misguided.  Although 
there are no United States Supreme Court cases that directly 
address this issue, two cases ultimately support an adoption of 
the possession test.  Moreover, the possession test provides 
precision, clarity, and conformity to existing Fourth Amendment 
principles.  Thus, it is more than likely that the Supreme Court 
would be less than hesitant to adopt it. 
III. THE POSSESSION TEST’S PRECISION, CLARITY, AND 
CONFORMITY TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT JUSTIFIES ITS 
ADOPTION 
When addressing the issue of whether a visitor’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in another’s home equally extends to his 
belongings, it is evident that the possession test provides the 
most precision, clarity, and conformity to current Fourth 
Amendment principles.  Furthermore, the possession test’s 
approach aligns with current United States Supreme Court 
cases.  In comparison, the relationship and actual-notice tests not 
only fail to accomplish these goals, but also severely undermine 
well-established Fourth Amendment principles. 
A. The Possession Test’s Conformity to the Fourth Amendment 
The search of a visitor’s belongings during the execution of a 
search warrant presents a unique issue.  Although a warrant 
may be valid to search the premises, the warrant lacks probable 
cause with respect to the visitor.  As discussed earlier, 
warrantless searches do not automatically afford a person the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment.108  Instead, a balancing of 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 439 (citing Carman v. State, 602 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Alaska 1979)). 
107 Id. (quoting State v. Nabarro, 525 P.2d 573, 577 (Haw. 1974)). 
108 See Fourth Amendment, supra note 35. 
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the “degree of intrusion on the individual’s right to privacy and 
the need to promote government interests and special needs” 
must be conducted.109 
As seen in Jones, Olson, and Carter, the Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized that visitors, depending on the 
circumstances, may hold an expectation of privacy that society 
recognizes as reasonable.110  This gives a presumption that any 
intrusion into that privacy constitutes an unreasonable search.111  
However, a conflicting rule of law exists, for a valid warrant gives 
officers the authority to “open[] and inspect[] . . . any containers 
on the premises where the object of the warrant may be 
hidden.”112  The issuance of the warrant itself acts as the 
“balancing between governmental interest in investigating crime 
and the degree of intrusion into a citizen’s privacy.”113 
The warrant embodies the government’s interest in 
investigating crime.  The issuance of a warrant is based on 
probable cause,114 that is, the authority for a search is based on 
inferences drawn by police.115  The Supreme Court has held that 
“[a] lawful search of fixed premises generally extends to the 
entire area in which the object of the search may be found.”116  
For example, a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a 
home for illegal weapons also grants that officer the authority to 
open closets, drawers, and any containers in which the weapon 
may be concealed.117  The officer is not “limited by the possibility 
that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to 
complete the search.”118  On the forefront, the warrant justifies 
such broad government intrusion.119  However, as discussed in 
109 Id. 
110 See supra Part I.B. 
111 See Fourth Amendment, supra note 35. 
112 Waters v. State, 924 P.2d 437, 439 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (noting the issue of 
two conflicting laws). 
113 GREENHALGH, supra note 42, at 14. 
114 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. But see Barry Jeffrey Stern, Warrants Without 
Probable Cause, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1385, 1385–86 (1994) (noting that the Supreme 
Court has found that a warrant is not always required). 
115 Erica Goldberg, Getting Beyond Intuition in the Probable Cause Inquiry, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 799–800 (2013). 
116 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820 (1982). 
117 Id. at 821. 
118 Id. at 820–21 (comparing the validity of the search of a home’s draws and 
containers to the search of a car’s trunk, glove compartment, and packages). 
119 See id. at 823 (“A container that may conceal the object of . . . [the] warrant 
may be opened immediately; the individual's interest in privacy must give way to 
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Gilstrap, “ ‘[s]pecial concerns arise when the items to be searched 
belong to visitors, and not occupants, of the premises’ because 
these ‘searches may become personal searches outside the scope 
of the premises search warrant.’ ”120 
The possession test adequately balances the government’s 
interest in finding evidence of crime and a visitor’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy.  For one, if the visitor possesses the item, 
it no longer becomes an object within the premises subjecting it 
to a lawful search.121  The importance of this, as the Supreme 
Court has noted, is the Fourth Amendment’s distinction between 
body searches and property searches.122  Additionally, the reason 
behind the authorized search arises from the officer’s “reasonable 
cause to believe that the specific ‘things’ to be searched for and 
seized are located on the property to which entry is sought.”123  It 
is for this reason only that officers are allowed to open any 
container in which the object of the warrant may be hidden.124  
However, it is impossible for police officers to have reasonably 
believed that a visitor’s items holds evidence relevant to their 
search, mainly because the officers had no reason to believe the 
visitor would be present.  Furthermore, “mere propinquity to 
others independently suspected of criminal activity does not, 
without more, give rise to probable cause to search that 
person.”125 
Courts that oppose the possession test argue that the ability 
to find the object in the warrant is frustrated when visitors are 
on the premises, since “there are hands inside the premises to 
the magistrate's official determination of probable cause.”); Zurcher v. Stanford 
Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978) (“[W]hen the State's reason to believe incriminating 
evidence will be found becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes 
justified and a warrant to search and seize will issue.” (quoting Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976))). 
120 State v. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d 43, 44 (Ariz. 2014) (quoting United States v. 
Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 544 (5th Cir. 1987)). 
121 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
122 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 555 (“Search warrants are not directed at persons; they 
authorize the search of ‘place[s]’ and the seizure of ‘things,’ and as a constitutional 
matter they need not even name the person from whom the things will be seized.”); 
see discussion infra Part III.B. 
123 Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 556. 
124 See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
125 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979) (citing Sibron v. State, 392 U.S. 40, 
62–63 (1968)). 
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pick up objects before the door is opened by the police.”126  Even if 
this were true, common practicalities used by officers when 
conducting searches make this argument obsolete.  First, no 
matter the type of search, most people freely give their consent 
when asked by police to be searched.127  Moreover, even if the 
consenter argues that consent was unintentional or inaudible 
under the circumstances, courts seem to favor a finding that 
consent was given.128  Second, it is well established that police 
rarely take no for an answer, often repeatedly asking for consent 
to search until they receive an affirmative answer.129  Finally, the 
argument that a visitor would pick up incriminating evidence 
upon hearing the police at the door is largely based on the 
assumption that visitors, and society in general, are well versed 
in Fourth Amendment law, a theory that has been shown to be 
unlikely.130  Accordingly, the practicalities used by officers when 
conducting searches make this argument immaterial.131 
In sum, the conformity of the possession test to current 
Fourth Amendment principles would sway the Supreme Court to 
its ultimate adoption.  Under the Fourth Amendment, for a 
search to be unreasonable, a balancing of an individual’s privacy 
interest and the government’s interest must be conducted.  The 
possession test adequately maintains this balance.  Although 
officers armed with a warrant have probable cause to search 
every container within, the lack of probable cause towards the 
126 United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 431 (1st Cir. 1973). The court 
recognized that this loophole led one court to bar such acts by authorizing the search 
of an item held in a person’s hand. Id. (citing Walker v. United States, 327 F.2d 597, 
600 (D.C. Cir. 1963)). 
127 See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero, 374 F.3d 584, 588 (8th Cir. 2004) (“[The 
defendant] signed the consent form; [the defendant] did not object while [the officer] 
conducted the search; and, when [the officer] asked [the defendant] to follow him to 
the garage he complied without difficulty.”); United States v. Shranklen, 315 F.3d 
959, 960 (8th Cir. 2003) (consenting to search of a truck); United States v. Stokely, 
733 F. Supp. 2d 868, 875 (E.D. Tenn. 2010) (consenting to search of home). 
128 See, e.g., United States v. Cedano-Medina, 366 F.3d 682, 684–85, 688 (8th 
Cir. 2004) (finding a search reasonable after receiving a number of varying 
responses). The law even recognizes consent by third parties. See United States v. 
Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165–66, 177–78 (1974) (consenting to the search of a home by 
third party). 
129 See, e.g., Cedano-Medina, 366 F.3d at 685–86. 
130 Although the law presumes that citizens know the law, “[a]verage citizens do 
not peruse statute books even once in their lifetimes; most will never read even one 
full paragraph from a court opinion.” Drury Stevenson, To Whom Is the Law 
Addressed?, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 105, 106 (2003). 
131 See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
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visitor, coupled with their belongings being in their personal 
possession, undeniably outweighs the government’s interest.  
Moreover, the possession test’s application coincides with current 
Supreme Court case law. 
B. The Supreme Court’s Insight: The Possession Test Is 
Supported by Both Ybarra and Houghton 
The Supreme Court in Ybarra v. Illinois132 addressed an 
officer’s authority to search a bar patron, while executing a valid 
warrant in a local tavern.133  In its analysis, the Court 
acknowledged, “[A] search or seizure of a person must be 
supported by probable cause particularized with respect to that 
person.”134  The requirement of particularity may not be 
“undercut” simply because there is probable cause to search the 
premises “where the person may happen to be.”135  The Court 
stood for the proposition that, in the absence of reasonable belief 
that the patron was involved in any criminal activity or that the 
person was armed and dangerous, a search and seizure of that 
patron was not permissible.136 
The holding in Ybarra supports the proposition that a person 
has a high and reasonable expectation of privacy when it comes 
to the search of their person.137  Ybarra limits “a premises 
warrant [to only] authorize[] police to search any item that might 
contain the object of the search by holding that the warrant does 
not authorize the search of a person it does not name.”138   
 
132 444 U.S. 85 (1979). 
133 Id. at 87–88. 
134 Id. at 91 (emphasis added). 
135 Id. (holding that the warrant gave the officers authority to search the 
premises, not to search the tavern’s customers). 
136 Id. at 92–93. The reasonable belief or suspicion standard is one of the well-
delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. It is more commonly known as a 
Terry search. See GREENHALGH, supra note 42, at 18–19. Some argue, as did the 
government in Ybarra, that under certain circumstances the reasonable belief or 
suspicion standard should be made applicable to aid in the evidence-gathering 
function of the search warrant for premises. See Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 94. This 
argument, however, goes against the long prevailing rule that just because one is in 
the presence of a suspect does not equally make him guilty. See id. at 91; see also 
e.g., United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948) (“We are not convinced that a 
person, by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his 
person to which he would otherwise be entitled.”). 
137 See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
138 State v. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d 43, 46 (Ariz. 2014). 
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“[S]earches of a person involve a higher degree of intrusiveness 
and require justification in addition to that provided by the 
probable cause that supports a premises warrant.”139 
The Supreme Court’s holding in Wyoming v. Houghton140 also 
implies that the Court would ultimately adopt the possession 
rule.  The Court in Houghton addressed a passenger’s 
expectation of privacy regarding her purse during the search of a 
car.141  While conducting the search, an officer found a purse in 
the car’s passenger compartment.142  The passenger claimed the 
purse as her own.143  In it, the officer found drug paraphernalia, 
and arrested the passenger.144  The trial court denied the 
passenger’s motion to suppress by finding that the officer’s 
probable cause to search the vehicle by extension gave him cause 
to search containers found within.145  The Wyoming Supreme 
Court reversed.146  The Supreme Court, however, reversed the 
Wyoming Supreme Court, finding that the passenger’s reduced 
reasonable expectation of privacy, compared to the government’s 
high interest, supported the finding of a reasonable search.147 
More importantly for present purposes is the reasoning 
offered by Justice Breyer’s concurrence.  Justice Breyer focused 
on the fact that the purse at issue was “found at a considerable 
distance from its owner.”148  He further noted that “personal 
items,” like the defendant’s purse, are ones “that people generally 
like to keep with them at all times.”149  For this reason, Justice 






140 526 U.S. 295 (1999). 
141 Id. at 297–98. 
142 Id. at 298. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 298–99. 
146 Id. at 299. 
147 Id. at 303–04. 
148 Id. at 308 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
149 Id. (“But I can say that it would matter if a woman's purse, like a man's 
billfold, were attached to her person. It might then amount to a kind of ‘outer 
clothing.’ ”); see generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (finding that the search of 
the defendant’s outer clothing constituted a search of his persons). 
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intrusion similar to a search of one’s person, and hinted that 
rules like Ybarra and Terry may ultimately govern.150  
Unfortunately, the Houghton Court limited its holding to car 
searches.151 
Nonethelesss, the thrust and tone of the Houghton opinion, 
coupled with Ybarra, unquestionably supports an adoption of the 
possession test.  It is impractical to consider a person’s 
belongings as an extension of that person in accordance with 
Ybarra, unless they possess the item.152  Failure to hold such 
item subjects the item to a lawful search,153 and a person’s 
expectation of privacy and the invasiveness nature of the search 
“would not attach . . . until the police officer knows or has reason 
to know that the container belongs” to that person, whether a 
visitor in a home or a passenger in a car.154 
The possession test is the best way for officers to determine 
whether a container belongs to a visitor.  It is clear and easy for 
officers to apply.155  If the visitor possesses the item and is not 
named in the warrant, the visitor and the items they possess 
150 Houghton, 526 U.S. at 308 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
151 Id. at 307–08 (“Obviously, the rule applies only to automobile searches. 
Equally obviously, the rule apples only to containers found within automobiles.”). 
152 See id. at 303–07 (majority opinion). 
153 See supra Part III.A. See generally United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 
(1982). 
154 See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 305. Although it may seem that Justice Breyer is 
hinting towards the actual-notice test, the overall thrust of his concurrence suggests 
his preference of the possession test. Id. at 307–08 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
Furthermore, policy reasons severely undercut the actual-notice test. See discussion 
infra Part III.C. 
155 See State v. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d 43, 46 (Ariz. 2014). It is arguable that 
possession does not provide such a bright-line rule given the issue of constructive 
possession. This occurs when the item is not in the possession of the person, but is 
instead relatively close to the person. An example would be if the item were on the 
ground next to the owner’s feet, or as in People v. Reyes, where the defendant’s 
clothes laid nearby as he showered. See generally People v. Reyes, 273 Cal. Rptr. 61 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1990). The Reyes court concluded that in this instance, the item was 
still an extension of the defendant’s person, and therefore guarded by the Fourth 
Amendment. Id. at 65. It is best that the courts stay away from expanding the 
possession rule in this manner. Allowing a constructive possession element “would 
thwart [the] goal [of having a bright-line rule] by requiring law enforcement officers 
to guess whether items in proximity to a person not identified in the warrant” 
actually belong to that person. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d at 46. Having officers play this 
guessing game gives people—assuming that people are readily sophisticated in the 
law—an opportunity to claim items they do not own simply because it contains the 
substance searched for in the warrant. A person’s incentive to prevent government 
intrusion and criminality is an interest that the Supreme Court considers when 
assessing Fourth Amendment issues. See Houghton, 526 U.S. at 304. 
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should be free from government intrusion.  However, if the item 
is not within the visitor’s possession, the officers may search the 
item, but only if the item is capable of holding the subject of the 
warrant. 
Taken together, the possession test is not only consistent 
with the text and interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, but it 
also aligns with rationale and policy considerations of current 
Supreme Court case law.  By no means, however, is the 
possession test perfect.  Like any rule of law, the test has 
negative consequences.  Nevertheless, the overbearing negatives 
of the relationship and actual-notice tests outweigh any of the 
possession test’s negative implications. 
C. The Negatives of the Possession Test Are Not Overwhelming 
Courts have held that because of the possession test’s 
negative implications, it should either not be used at all, or 
should not be the sole test used to assess whether a search was 
reasonable.156  For example, the First Circuit found that the test 
suffers from being both too broad and too narrow.157  On one 
hand, the possession test “is too broad in that a search warrant 
could be frustrated to the extent that there are hands inside the 
premises to pick up objects before the door is opened by the 
police.”158  By the same token, the possession test can be too 
narrow in that “it would leave vulnerable many personal effects, 
such as wallets, purses, cases, or overcoats, which are often set 
down upon chairs or counters, hung on racks, or checked for 
convenient storage.”159  In this way, the Fourth Amendment’s 
interest in protecting privacy “is hardly furthered by making its 






156 See United States v. Giwa, 831 F.2d 538, 544 (5th Cir. 1987) (“[M]ere 
physical possession should not be the sole criterion which should be used to 
determine whether a personal item may be searched pursuant to a premises search 
warrant.”); see also supra Part II.B–C. 
157 United States v. Micheli, 487 F.2d 429, 431 (1st Cir. 1973) (“This has the 
virtue of precision but suffers from being at once too broad and too narrow.”). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
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holding or wearing his personal belongings after he chances into 
a place where a search is underway.”160  Accordingly, courts have 
looked to both the relationship and possession test for 
guidance.161 
The negative consequences of the possession test are easily 
negated.  For one, and as explained earlier, the argument that 
the test leaves room for fraud—as in the persons inside the home 
may pick up items not belonging to them—is easily overruled by 
other practical implications of the Fourth Amendment law.162  
Even if the possibility for fraud is taken into consideration, 
courts have noted that the possession test is still much less 
“susceptible to abuse.”163 
There is greater room for fraud under the relationship and 
actual-notice tests.  For example, once inside, the police, knowing 
that the visitor is not named within the warrant, may ask him to 
step aside giving the visitor notice that he is not susceptible to a 
search and the opportunity to “simply assert ownership to 
immunize property from [the] search.”164  Even worse, the “police 
could make a point of never being put on notice [even if they 
were] so that they could assume all items were searchable.”165 
The second noted consequence of the possession test is that it 
leaves vulnerable many personal items that are often set down.  
Although this may be true, it may be easily reconciled by turning 
to Katz and other Fourth Amendment precedent in which courts 
have held that it is unreasonable for a person to believe that 
their belongings would remain untouched if left unattended.166 
160 Id. 
161 See Giwa, 831 F.2d at 544–45 (“In the instant case, we agree with the district 
court’s conclusion that mere physical possession should not be the sole criterion 
which should be used . . . . We believe that the better approach is . . . examin[ing] the 
relationship between the person and the place.”). 
162 See supra notes 126–31 and accompanying text. 
163 State v. Leiper, 761 A.2d 458, 462 (N.H. 2000). 
164 Id. (quoting State v. Andrews, 549 N.W.2d 210, 217 (Wis. 1996)). 
165 Id. Some police officers are far from shy when it comes to deception. See 
generally Robert P. Mosteller, Police Deception Before Miranda Warnings: The Case 
for Per Se Prohibition of an Entirely Unjustified Practice at the Most Critical 
Moment, 39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1239 (2007). However, in most cases, their reasoning 
for the deception lies within good intentions, either to vindicate the victim or stop 
crime. See generally id. But, an officer’s good intention behind deception does not 
negate the fact that deception does occur. 
166 E.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999); United States v. Teller, 397 
F.2d 494 (7th Cir. 1968); cases cited supra note 81. 
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An adoption of the possession test does not mean that under 
no circumstances will an officer be able to search a visitor’s 
belongings.167  The possession test is still subject to many well-
known exceptions, which authorize police to conduct a search 
without a warrant.168  For instance, there may be circumstances 
that give the officers probable cause to arrest the visitor.169  
Consequently, and subject to certain limitations, a search of the 
visitor’s belongings can be made incident to the arrest.170  
Furthermore, in many instances, people do not object to searches, 
and often comply with the police without hesitation.171  Moreover, 
some courts have added rules to the possession rule, making it 
easier for a visitor’s belongings to be within the scope of the 
warrant.172 
Accordingly, the negatives that surround the possession test 
are not overwhelming when balanced with the potential positive 
considerations.  Additionally, and more importantly, the 
possession test provides guidance, precision, and clarity to 
officers and courts regarding police authority during the 
execution of premises warrants. 
D. The Possession Test Provides Guidance, Precision, and 
Clarity 
The possession test provides guidance, precision, and clarity, 
while the other tests create confusion and chaos.  For one, the 
relationship test is hard for police officers to implement while 
executing premises warrants.173  Searches are usually conducted 
under “harried, dangerous circumstances.”174  Therefore, “officers 
167 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 4.10(b), at 950–51 (5th ed. 2012). 
168 See id. 
169 Id. at 951. 
170 See id.; see also GREENHALGH, supra note 42, at 16–17. 
171 See supra Part III.A. 
172 See LAFAVE, supra note 167, at 952–53. The D.C. Circuit has adopted an 
exception, which states that in the event that “the police could reasonably have 
believed that items sought and described in the warrant had been concealed in the 
purse, and, notwithstanding [the defendant’s] status as a visitor on the premises, 
could have searched the purse in pursuit of items for which the warrant issued.” 
United States v. Johnson, 475 F.2d 977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
173 State v. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d 43, 46 (Ariz. 2014). 
174 Id. For example, when granted a warrant under the “no-knock” provision, 
officers do not have to announce their presence, and therefore “smash down the front 
doors of homes with battering rams and rush inside with guns drawn.” Charles 
Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New Approach to the 
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may not be readily able to identify the relationships between 
persons and the premises.”175  The inability to identify the 
relationship between the visitor and the premises makes it 
virtually impossible for police to effectively search a dwelling 
because officers will not know which items could be searched or 
not.176  The officers would have to establish ownership of each 
item on the premises, and then “determine whether the owner of 
the item or container was merely a ‘transient visitor’ or whether 
there was some greater connection to the premises.”177 
Similarly, the actual-notice test fails to give officers the 
simplistic guidance and precision that the possession test 
provides.  The actual-notice test allows officers to search an item, 
unless they are put on notice that the item belongs to a non-
resident.178  Although the actual-notice test takes the focus off the 
relationship and instead places it on the notice given to police in 
regards to the item’s ownership,179 the test presents similar 
policy concerns. 
The actual-notice test hinders the government’s interest by 
requiring an officer to engage in a colloquy with persons not 
contained in the search warrant.180  “One would expect [the] 
confederates to claim everything as their own.”181  This possibility 
hinders the Government’s ability to find the searched items 
because, under this test, the police are unable to search it after 
the confederate makes his claims.  Furthermore, the 
interpretation of the actual-notice test may give rise to a parade 




Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 685 (1993). This 
provision was developed as an effort to diminish the increasing “peril police officers 
face in executing search warrants in the often violent drug trade.” Id. at 703. Drug 
abuse and the violent crime it spawns are “among the greatest dangers facing the 
United States today,” and are often the reasons for the grant of a warrant. See id. at 
685 (discussing the purpose of the “no-knock” rule as an effort to prevent the 
destruction of drug evidence). 
175 Gilstrap, 332 P.3d at 46. 
176 See Commonwealth v. Reese, 549 A.2d 909, 911 (Pa. 1988). 
177 State v. Jackson, 873 P.2d 1166, 1168 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
178 See Gilstrap, 332 P.3d at 45. 
179 Reese, 549 A.2d at 911. 
180 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 305 (1999). 
181 Id. 
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should have believed [a person’s] claim of ownership, [and] 
whether . . . he had probable cause to believe that the [person] 
was a confederate.”182  The Houghton Court directly expressed 
concern with requiring such inquiry and guessing.183 
When balancing the competing interests of a person’s Fourth 
Amendment protection and governmental interests, the Supreme 
Court has noted that one “must take account of these practical 
realities,”184 and the possession test adequately does so.  For 
instance, it eliminates the need for the inquiry between officers 
and visitors in order to determine the relationship between the 
person and the place.  Additionally, it eliminates the opportunity 
to hide contraband or evidence of criminal activity, since visitors 
will not have the chance to claim their belongings.  Furthermore, 
both the relationship and actual-notice tests are “so nebulous”185 
that they ultimately lead to different results,186 while the 
possession test leads to consistency in rulings.  The possession 
test simply looks at whether the visitor possessed the item at the 
time the officers began their search, and if they did, the court 
would ultimately find a violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
Accordingly, the possession test leaves no room for error, 
providing the utmost guidance and certainty for police officers 
conducting search warrants. 
CONCLUSION 
The possession test should be adopted as a means to 
determine the issue of a search of a visitor’s belongings.  This test 
provides a bright-line rule that will result in consistency in 
rulings and make it easier for officers to determine when an item 
belonging to a visitor may be searched.  Regardless of the limited 
car-specific language of Houghton, the tone of the Court, along 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
184 Id. at 306. 
185 State v. Gilstrap, 332 P.3d 43, 46 (Ariz. 2014) (“[T]he relationship/notice test 
is so nebulous it provides little guidance to police officers or trial courts.” (quoting 
State v. Leiper, 761 A.2d 458, 462 (N.H. 2000))). 
186 Compare Carman v. State, 602 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Alaska 1979) (finding that a 
search of a purse during the execution of a warrant with only male occupants named 
was within the scope of the warrant because there was no notice of ownership), with 
State v. Lambert, 710 P.2d 693, 697–98 (Kan. 1985) (finding that a search of a purse 
during the execution of a warrant with only male occupants named was illegal 
because the police could not have reasonably believed it belonged to the man named 
in the warrant). 
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with the holding of Ybarra shows that the Supreme Court would 
apply the possession test if confronted with the issue.  
Furthermore, the possession test conforms to current policies and 
principles behind the Fourth Amendment.  The relationship and 
actual-notice tests fail to accomplish these goals. 
